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Abstract—This research analyses the impact of counterfeit drugs on the healthcare supply chain
industry and evaluates the solutions currently in place to reduce the number of fake counterfeits
coming to the market. The discussions are undertaken to determine what conceptions industry
professionals have about applying Blockchain in the pharmaceutical industry, especially in the
supply chain. The obtained feedback information is used to build requirements for a Blockchain
driven tool called “PharmaCrypt”. This tool will be used to track and trace drugs as they move
through the supply chain, uploading the data collected to a distributed Blockchain ledger
validating the authenticity of the drug. Through a setup, we have built a tool prototype that uses
the Amazon Web Services Blockchain platform to show the feasibility of implementing such
technology within the industry.
Keywords- Blockchain, Counterfeit drugs, Pharmaceutical industry, Security, Amazon web
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Introduction
The presence of counterfeit medicines within
the healthcare industry is evident with 1 in 10
medical products in developing countries being
substandard or falsified [1]. Falsified medicines
can contain incorrect ingredients and doses or
show no presence of the active ingredient. This
means that there are millions of patients unaware
that they are taking medicines that fail to work as
prescribed. Not only will they fail to treat indi-
viduals, but some counterfeits can cause serious
illness or even death. A modeling exercise devel-
oped by the University of Edinburgh estimates
that 72,000 to 169,000 children may be dying
each year from pneumonia due to substandard
and falsified antibiotics [1]. Counterfeits are a
huge commercial drain for individuals, health
care systems, and in some cases, can lead to a
further financial burden on the health care system
if the patient requires treatment consequently.
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Problem Statement
The healthcare industry is rife with counterfeit
drugs that penetrate the industry’s supply chain
[2]. This is due to a complex supply chain,
compounded by a lack of visibility of the prod-
ucts end-to-end journey. The effects of falsified
and counterfeit drugs have the potential to cause
devastating consequences.
The complexity of the drug distribution sup-
ply chain makes it difficult to prevent counter-
feits infiltrating the industry. There are numerous
companies involved in the supply chain where
drugs change ownership between manufactures
to distributors, repackages and wholesalers before
reaching the patient. There is little or no visibility
between the parties involved in the supply chain
in order to track the authenticity of the drug.
This causes a level of uncertainty for patients
and dispensary’s concerning the authenticity of
the product sold at the end of the chain.
There are currently several solutions to the
problem, but as the sophistication of counterfeit
products and packaging rapidly improves, they
have flaws and limitations. Some solutions en-
deavour to trace transactions of the products as
they move through the supply chain and change
ownership, although there is still a central organi-
sation present that is at risk of being compromised
whereby documents can easily be falsified. Also,
a central system is prone to a single point of
failure. Solutions like our proposal could poten-
tially be adapted to include the anti-tampering and
distributed database capacities of Blockchain.
Proposed Solution and Contributions
The proposed solution is to create a
Blockchain driven tool that can be used to record
and timestamp the transfer of goods at each point
in the pharmaceutical supply chain. As the drug
travels through the supply chain, every transac-
tion of goods will be noted and timestamped by
scanning the barcode. The ledger will be used
in order to ensure the security and safety of the
product. A three-fold contribution to this work is
as follows:
• Analysis of the problem and a demonstration
whether utilising Blockchain could be a better
solution to the supply chain of drugs than the
existing solutions.
• Designing and creation of an application tool
that can be used to record the origin of the
drugs manufactured, its contents and times-
tamp the transfer of goods.
• Provide recommendations based on the tool’s
functioning as to whether (and how) utilising
Blockchain technology is the best way to solve
this problem.
Background Study
This section discusses the problem domain in
greater depth, highlights existing solutions and
evaluating their limitations. The segment will also
deliberate as to why a Blockchain solution could
be an improved idea compared to the current
solutions.
Drug Supply Chain in the Pharmaceutical
Industry
The Pharmaceutical supply chain is the means
in which prescription medicines are delivered to
patients [3]. Ingredients for medicines are nor-
mally sourced from a variety of places before
reaching its final formula. Once the final formula
is achieved, the drug can be distributed. During
the supply chain life cycle, the drug will transfer
among many different entities, specifically be-
tween the manufacturer and the patient. Every
transaction offers an opportunity for counterfeit
or falsified products to penetrate the supply chain
and the industry. Figure 1 shows a typical supply
chain scenario in the Pharmaceutical industry.
Manufacturers, Wholesalers and Pharma-
cies The Manufactures’ role within the sup-
ply chain is to ensure the readiness of their
inventory of drugs so they can be distributed
to wholesalers. Manufactures receive orders from
distributors/wholesalers, they then ship the prod-
ucts to the distributor’s warehouses where they
will be put away in storage. Distributors will
provide manufactures with inventory data reports
to maintain transparency throughout the process.
The role of wholesalers is to make the process
of purchasing pharmaceutical drugs a simpler
and more efficient process. Wholesalers connect
and deliver to thousands of pharmacies and dis-
pensers. This saves manufactures efforts of dis-
patching drugs to pharmacies individually, instead
they can send large batches of medications to
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Figure 1: Pharmaceutical supply chain.
a relatively smaller number of wholesalers in
comparison. Once the product is in the hands of
the wholesaler, they provide a range of services,
including drug distribution, electronic order ser-
vices and repackaging.
The final entities in the supply chain is Phar-
macies and Hospitals. Pharmacies account for ap-
proximately 75% of the prescription drug market,
whereas Non-retail providers such as hospitals
comprise the remaining 25% [4]. Pharmacies and
Hospitals purchase products from wholesalers
where they are then sold to the final patient.
The Wholesaler Problem Primary whole-
salers have direct distribution contracts with the
manufactures they purchase from. Whereas, sec-
ondary wholesalers purchase products from a
range of other parties. Shown by the arrows
between the two wholesalers in Figure 1, it may
not always be obvious to distinguish whether a
company is a secondary or a primary whole-
saler. For example, a primary wholesaler may
not only purchase products directly from the
manufacturer, they may also purchase from sec-
ondary wholesalers depending on the demand
for certain medicines. The buying and selling
between wholesalers is common within the indus-
try, products move between a variety of different
companies and can be repeatedly repackaged by
each wholesaler before reaching the patient.
In a process called Sating, counterfeit drugs
can be merged and be confused with legitimate
products at the wholesalers. This can be caused
unknowingly if for example a wholesaler pur-
chases from a secondary wholesaler company
where they have accidentally purchased counter-
feit goods. During the repackaging process at the
wholesaler, the counterfeit drugs may be given
genuine labels. Manufacturers initially deliver
medicines in fraud protection packaging. These
can be removed during the repackaging phase and
batch numbers may be reprinted.
Drug Diversion Drug diversion is when drugs
that have been authorised to be sold in one coun-
try are sold in another. Criminals take advantage
of segments in the supply chain where products
leave a documented chain of custody and they
can implant falsified goods. Markets that trade in
diverted drugs usually have little oversite from
authorities and are known as Grey markets.
Existing Solutions
This section briefly discusses the current so-
lutions that are in place.
Packaging In an attempt to reduce the im-
pact of counterfeit drugs, several pharmaceutical
companies have adopted a more sophisticated
packaging approach. One of these approaches is
the use of holographic technologies. The con-
cept is that a patient will know if the product
is legitimate when they see that the packaging
contains a hologram. A major advantage of this
type of packaging is that it can be applied to every
individual item. Although, this type of packaging
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Table 1: Comparing Existing Solutions
Solution Pros Cons
Packaging Easy for patients to determine whether the drug
is legitimate if they see a hologram on the
packaging
Expensive, Can be cloned, Origin of fraud-
ulent products cannot be located
Mass serialization Ability to track and trace, Chips can be dis-
guised in large batches to avoid tampering
Costly, Potential to be hacked, Compatibil-
ity issues, Chips have the potential to be
tampered with
Mass encryption technology Each batch is given a unique code to them Complicated to implement
Falsified Medicines Directive EU wide directive, Set the standards for all
Manufacturers
Only exists in the UK, Packaging can be
forged, A centralised authority that could
be liable to attack
can be costly to implement depending on the
complexity of the hologram. Holograms can also
eventually be cloned by counterfeit companies
making the original secure packaging ineffective.
Another disadvantage to this solution is that it
does not offer companies intelligence for when a
counterfeit product penetrates the supply chain.
Mass Serialization Mass serialization is a
technology used to identify and track objects and
individuals using radio frequency waves. Manu-
facturers can use Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) coding to allocate packages with unique
identifiers. As the product makes its way through
the supply chain, the products information is
captured by a chip reader. The chips can be dis-
guised within large batches of products to avoid
tampering. However, RFID is costly to implement
as the RFID tags themselves are expensive. There
are many types of systems that include varied
readers and tags creating compatibility issues [5].
Another concern with the technology is that they
have the potential to be hacked and information
on the tags can potentially be altered [6].
Mass Encryption Technology Software
based mass encryption technology can be used
in the pharmaceutical industry to fight against
counterfeit drugs. The same software is required
to decrypt the digital code [7]. This technology
requires a large database server to store the data.
Falsified Medicines Directive: Safety Fea-
tures The Falsified Medicines Directive is an
EU directive (as of 9th February 2019) that aims
to ensure that medicines in the EU are safe
by including a unique identifier and an anti-
tampering device on the packaging and a trade of
them is properly controlled [8]. As the product
goes through the supply chain, at various point it
is mandatory that the barcode is scanned again.
This aims to certify the authenticity and trust-
worthiness of the medicine supplied. The unique
identifier on the packaging must encompass a
product code determining the medicine name,
common name, Pharmaceutical form (strength,
pack size and pack types), serial number, batch
number and expiry date.
Manufacturers are required to comply with
this EU directive as of 9th February 2019. Table 1
displays the pros and cons of the current solutions
discussed.
Why Blockchain?
This section explains why we believe that
Blockchain is the suitable solution.
Blockchain - Technical Feasibility
Blockchain is a digital technology model that
can be utilised to store data, it consists of a chain
of blocks containing transaction information [9].
It is a decentralized system where data can be
shared across a network in an encrypted fashion.
Before a transaction can be added to a
Blockchain, it needs to be verified by the network
nodes by utilizing a majority consensus protocol,
where nodes on the network agree that the trans-
action is legitimate. Any transactions that have
been recorded cannot be altered or erased and
the full transactional history can be viewed at any
time. Each block in the chain contains data: the
hash of the block, the hash value of the previous
block and the nonce of the existing block. Hash-
ing is used to make integrity-protected blocks
together to create the secure chain. Every data
block in the Blockchain is given a unique digital
signature that directly corresponds to the data in
its block (the hash). If the data in the block is
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changed, the digital signature of the block will
also subsequently change.
A block registers transactions as they occur
and the Blockchain increases in size periodically
as new transactions execute. Once the block is
filled, it is allocated a digital signature that di-
rectly corresponds to the string of data in that
block (hash). The first block in the chain is
known as the genesis bock and do not point
to any previous blocks. In order to link another
block of transaction data, the signature in the first
block is added to the data of the following block.
The digital signature of the second block is now
partially dependent on the signature of the block
before it, as it is included in the data of the
block. This process is repeated every time new
transactions occur to create the chain.
Blockchain Platforms
We discuss three main platforms that were
considered in this work - Ethereum App Plat-
form, Amazon Web Service (AWS), and Oracle
Blockchain.
Ethereum App Platform Ethereum is a pub-
lic distributed Blockchain network that provides
users with the appropriate environment to deploy
decentralized applications. The platform runs the
smart contracts that have been set by the ap-
plication developer. The Ethereum network is
made up of a series of distributed nodes and
Ethereum wallets. The distributed network of
nodes is established when computers or miners
join the network. The network does not hold any
permissions to join, as any node with enough
computing power is able to join the network.
Amazons Web Services (AWS) Amazons
Web Services provides cloud computing plat-
forms. Amazon offers Blockchain templates as
part of their platform, which provides users a
simple way to build Blockchain applications for
businesses. AWS provides the ledger database
behind the application that eradicates the need
for the application owner to develop the complex
Blockchain network. The service offers two types
of use cases: to track and verify transactions
with centralized ownership and execute transac-
tions and contracts with decentralized ownership
[10]. Using the AWS Blockchain template, an
Ethereum Blockchain network on a cluster made
up of multiple instances with an Application Load
Balancer (ALB) can be created.
We have used AWS platform since its service
makes easy to setup, deploy, and manage scalable
blockchain networks, which eliminates the need
to rely on other expensive implementations.
Oracle Blockchain Oracle is extremely sim-
ilar to AWS as it is a Blockchain-as-a-Service
(BAAS) provider. It offers businesses to deploy
applications over an immutable electronic dis-
tributed ledger database.
Blockchain Security
Blockchain not only allows user to integrate
with suppliers, customers, regulatory agencies
and stakeholders, but also provides such a high
degree of accuracy [6]. It also offers a higher level
of security compared to the existing solutions.
Immutability and Consensus The
immutable characteristics of Blockchain is
one of the main reasons companies are starting
to implement the technology. If a block is altered,
it will unchain itself from the consecutive blocks.
For an altered block to be accepted on the
Blockchain, it needs to be chained to the rest
of the blocks. All the nodes in the network
work together to create a consensus about which
blocks are valid and which are not. Users in
the Blockchain will be notified that data has
been altered and will deny the change. The
Blockchain will then be returned to a previous
state of the Blockchain where all blocks are still
chained together.
Private Keys Participating nodes in the net-
work are assigned their own private keys that are
linked to transactions they make. The private key
is used to create a digital signature and sign each
transaction. Each node in the network is allocated
a private key, which grants ownership to their data
entry [11].
Decentralization Rather than relying on a sin-
gle database to secure transactions with users,
Blockchain is completely decentralized. This
means there is no single point of failure. Being
decentralized means that there are multiple copies
Apr 2020 5
Journal of LATEX Class Files, Vol. xx, No. x, August 2019
of the same transactions, a hacker would need
to change all copies and break the consensus
protocol before they could alter anything.
Existing Solution Case Study: Cisco Supply
Chain Management
Cisco loses out on over $500 million dollars
of revenue a year due to counterfeit products
(similar to the UK loses £218 million every year
from counterfeit wine and spirits [12]; clearly it
is not just a problem faced by the developing
countries). As a result of this, Cisco are currently
working on a Blockchain solution designed to
combat against counterfeit products on their own
supply chain. Although Cisco works in a different
industry to the one the projected in this work,
their application of the technology is extremely
similar. A few other Enterprise Blockchain use
cases include [13]: Supply Chain Management
(IDM Food Trust), Protecting Digital Identity
(Civic’s Secure Identity Platform), Smarter Pre-
dictive Analyses (Endor), and Healthcare Medical
History and Records (Medicalchain).
There are some limitations too with the tech-
nology and we must know how these drawbacks
might be overcome. As the participation of each
organisation in the supply chain requires complex
infrastructure to be able to run a single node,
one of the main issues with Blockchain is the
cost of this infrastructure. To be able to sell the
solution to customers and suppliers, it is hard for
them to justify the cost. A possible resolution for
smaller companies could be to provide a cloud-
based solution, but it is not quite clear that how
well does this scale up. There is currently lots of
research being carried out to work out ways of
reducing the costs and monetising the process of
Blockchain.
Another limitation of Blockchain arises when
considering the consensus mechanism used.
There are multiple consensus protocols available.
In a public Blockchain, it is possible to specify a
single consensus mechanism used. Although, in
a private enterprise solution, it is not possible to
make an application as rigid. There is ongoing
research on how to make the consensus as quick
as possible and pluggable so that suppliers can
appoint the consensus they wish to use. For
a Blockchain enterprise application to be suc-
cessful, the consensus times need to ideally be
minutes or seconds. When choosing a consensus
mechanism, it is important that the protocol is
Byzantine Fault Tolerant.
Proposed Solution: Requirement and
Analysis
During the analysis stage of this work, profes-
sionals working or researching on the Blockchain
as well as in the pharmaceutical field were con-
tacted and collaborated with. The whole pur-
pose was to determine the current use cases of
Blockchain that are in practice in the industry,
people’s conceptions of the technology and how
staff in the pharmaceutical industry might cope or
react to a new supply chain management system.
Pharmaceutical Interviews/Discussions
The participants chosen were individuals who
either work in the healthcare industry in a dis-
pensary/pharmacy or as a pharmacist.
Pharmaceutical Feedback
We have interviewed 30 people who are di-
rectly or indirectly working in pharmaceutical
industry. Roughly 60% of the people said they
were aware of the counterfeit drugs problem.
Medicines are scanned on arrival, but this is more
for stock check purposes than authenticity. The
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory
Agency (MHRA) regularly alerts us if there are
any concerns regarding medicines and these are
relayed to all pharmacies and dispensary’s with
relevant batch numbers, they added. If you look
at what the Falsified Medicines Safety Features
Directive (FMD) requires, it might give you a
good idea on what to include. Off the top of my
head, I believe it is required that manufactures
provide the name, serial number, expiry date,
strength and batch number, but there maybe more.
To the answer of whether they will put their
trust in a Blockchain driven application that was
designed to track and trace a medicine as it makes
its way through the pharmaceutical supply chain,
most of the people were interested. The informa-
tion gathered indicated that the most important
material perceived by pharmacists required by an
application (tool) to ensure the trustworthiness
of a product would be: batch number, name,
expiry date and manufacturer. The majority of
people interviewed suggested barcode scanning is
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already in used for barcode scanning in their day-
to-day job and implied that they would consider
using an application (tool) that requires the use
of barcode scanning. The original data collected
from the focus group and interviews can be found
in the Appendix.
Setup and the “PharmaCrypt” Tool
This section explains the experimental set up
for the development of the proposed applica-
tion tool called “PharmaCrypt” using Ethereum
Blockchain, which is created using the Amazon
Web Services (AWS). The tool interface can be
seen in Figure 2. The network is utilised to create
a smart contract where products can be created
and transferred between accounts.
PharmaCrypt Features
The developed prototype of the tool has the
following features:
• Barcode Scan: Hand-held smart phone devices
are able to scan barcodes and upload the infor-
mation to the Blockchain.
• Asset Creation: The application is able to
create new assets for when products first enter
the supply chain. A products information is up-
loaded to the Blockchain number and assigns
a unique identifier number.
• Transfer of Asset: When a product is moved
on to the next supplier or entity in the supply
chain, the application tool records the transac-
tion.
• View Scanned Products: User is able to view
all products scanned by them.
• Performance Requirements: The application
tool scans barcodes instantly with no lags or
glitches. Consensus should be reached under a
few seconds.
• Security Requirements: (i) Separate accounts
for each user, (ii) Users are enrolled with their
business network accounts, (iii) Each password
is at least 8 characters long composed of at
least 1 upper case letter a number and 1 special
character, and (iv) Each user is operated using
the least set of privileges required to do their
job.
Blockchain Implementation
Amazons Web Services is chosen to create
the prototype of the proposed tool. The overall
software is hosted on a computer-based system,
which is configured with i7 processor, 500GB
HDD, 4GB RAM, and Windows 10 OS, and
the required data can be fetch to a mobile ap-
plication. The AWS Blockchain for Ethereum
creates a private Blockchain network on the AWS
CloudFormation. The final network is made up
of the following entities: two Ethereum clients,
one miner running on Amazon EC2 instances
in an Amazon EC3 cluster, on-Demand EC2
instances, and an internal Application Load Bal-
ancer (ABL). The entire process of the proposed
solution and building the PharmaCrypto tool is as
follows:
(i) PharmaCrypt Tool Interface: As the func-
tions of the application tool run on smartphone
devices are relatively limited, the user interface,
as shown in Figure 2, will largely be the same for
each company. Here, the user will be able to scan
the barcode of the product. Once the barcode has
been scanned, if the transactional data is deemed
legitimate by the network, it will be automatically
uploaded to the Blockchain. Users of this inter-
face will only be able to view the transactions
they have scanned themselves. If the transaction
is deemed illegitimate by the Blockchain network,
an error message will take over the screen. The
error message will trigger a notification sent to
the main computer-based interface controlled by
a senior personal. The supply chain management
team can then investigate this product further.
Figure 3 explains the information flow of the
proposed solution.
(ii) Key Pair Generation: AWS uses public-
key cryptography to secure the login information
of the instances in the network. As shown in Fig-
ure 4(a), we created a key pair for the Blockchain
Ethereum network, which is used to sign every
transaction over the network. The key pair must
be created in the same region you wish to launch
the instance in. The key pair will download and
the file name is the name you specified with a
.pem extension.
(iii) Subnets, Security Groups, and Rules: The
Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) is used to
define the virtual network where resources will be
launched. An Application Load Balancer (ALB)
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Figure 2: Proposed “PharmaCrypt” Application Tool User Interface.
is created requiring two public subnets to be
configured locating in two separate availability
zones. A private subnet is also necessary for the
container instances. The availability zone should
be located in the same zone as the ABL.
AWS Security groups control the inbound and
outbound traffic to your resources. We specify
two security groups: one is for controlling the
traffic between the EC2 instances in the cluster
and the other is for controlling the traffic between
the Application Load Balancer, EC2 instances
and the bastion host. Thereafter, we have applied
the following incoming rules to these groups, as
shown in Figure 4(b):
• Allow all traffic from the ALB security group
allowing the ALB to broadcast with itself and
the bastion host.
• Allow all traffic from the EC2 security group
allowing instances in the security group to
broadcast to the ALB and the bastion host.
• Allow SSH traffic from the IP address which
allows traffics from the computer to the bastion
host.
The below outbound rules also need to be applied
on the same security group:
• Allow all traffic from the EC2 security group
which allows outbound traffic from the ALB
and the bastion host to the instance.
• Allow all traffic from the ALB security group
which allows the ALB to communicate with
the bastion host and itself.
(iv) Identity and Access Management (IAM)
and Bastian Host: We have created a role for
AWS service selecting Elastic Container Service
for the service and Elastic Container Service for
the use case. Make a note of the Role - Amazon
Resource Name (ARN), as it will be needed
later. The Bastion Host is an Instance that is
used to connect to the web interfaces and other
instances in the network. To do so, the Bastion
Host forwards SSH traffic from trusted clients that
are outside of the VPC.
(v) CloudFormation Stack: Now the tool has
been configured and the Ethereum Network can
be created. To do so, an AWS CloudFormation
Stack needs to be set up. The AWS CloudFor-
mation Stack establishes an Amazon EC3 cluster
of EC3 instances. Launching this stack create
some nested stacks where we are able to con-
nect to the networks resources using the Bastion
Host. In the dashboard, their progress can be
observed by selecting “Stacks”. When the Stacks
have finished creating, the Output tab displays
8 IEEE Computer
Figure 3: Proposed solution information flow.
(a) Key pair creation for signing the transaction data.
(b) Security group control: inbound rules for the traffic.
Figure 4: Key-pair generation and security group
control.
Ethereum URLs we can connect to where the
EthStats (shows the time since something was
mined), EthExplorer (Blockchain explorer) and
EthJsonRPC (a stateless, light-weight JavaScript
Object Notation (JSON) Remote Procedure Call
(RPC)) are displayed.
(vi) Connect SSH port, Authenticate, and
Setup a Proxy: Now, to connect to the bastion
host, an SSH port forwarding connection is es-
tablished using PuTTy. The key pair needs to be
converted to a .ppk format as PuTTy does not
support the default .pem format. WE have used
RSA for the key generation. We have set the
following configurations: select Connection, SSH,
Tunnels; add 9001 as the source port and leave
destination as default (blank). Thereafter, use
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(a) Blockchain with Block Details (EthExplorerURL).
(b) Ethereum Blockchain Real-Time Network Status.
Figure 5: Ethereum Blockchain Network with
Block Details.
“Open” to authenticate the bastion host. We have
then configured a proxy (FoxyProxy for Chrome
browser) on port 9001 so that the forwarded port
can be used to connect to the Ethereum URLs.
The EthStatsURL displays the status of the
Ethereum Network. The EthExplorerURL where
transactions that have been made on the network,
is shown in Figure 5.
(vii) Smart Contract, Genesis Block Creation,
and Mining: Now, we need to create smart con-
tracts and run them (with Admin permission) on
the Blockchain network as shown in Figure 6.
To do this, we connect over to the Windows
Bastion Host using Remote Desktop Protocol
(RDP) with a decrypted password (using .pem
private key). Ethereum Wallet (allows to manage
Bitcoin, Ethereum, XRP and over 300 coins and
tokens) and geth (a command line interface for
running a full Ethereum node implementation) are
not designed to securely connect to the remote
nodes in the network using RPC. To set up a
secure connection, we run a local geth node that
joins the network.
The Genesis block is the first block in the
Blockchain network. The genesis block must be
compatible with the private Blockchain network
that has been created. Creating a genesis block
allows you to sync the node with the network. To
do so, define static node mapping in a JavaScript
Object Notation (JSON) file using the information
available in the Amazon DynamoDB table.
Now, the geth client needs to be initial-
ized to use the genesis block you constructed.
Thereafter, use Ethereum Wallet app to store the
keys, contracts, tokens and ether. We have used
mining with two threats for this demonstration
work. Now we have Ether, so we deploy the
first smart contract “Product Tracker” (Ethereum
Wallet application → Contracts → Deploy New
Contract). The smart contract uses the solidity
coding language to create (using Remix tool)
and transfer assets on the Ethereum Blockchain
network.
Discussion
To demonstrate the working of this tool, we
have used permissioned Blockchain, which is
in fact more scalable and faster, but works to-
wards centralized controls among a group of users
(who were involved in this work). However, this
work can be easily extended to permissionless
Blockchain, when required, so that any registered
user can validate transaction information and this
will be tested with trials. We have tested this tool
with 50 users making transactions on different
items to demonstrate that this tool is useful for
small and medium size pharmaceutical applica-
tions and we will further extend its capabilities
(by testing) for the applications with a wide vari-
ety of drugs and a large number of users involved
in the system. We have performed mining on the
cloud without an Application-Specific Integrated
Circuit (ASIC) miner. It does not yield any profit,
but the primary purpose of having it to able to
demonstrate the working of this prototype tool,
which at present will be used privately with
limited number of drugs and users involved in
the system.
Comparison
Compared to Drugledger in [11], the proposed
consumer-oriented application tool provides more
controllability, user-friendly interface, added se-
curity through groups, and private network virtu-
alisation. The proposed “PharmaCrypt” does not
require Certificate Service Provider, Anti-attack
Service Provider, and Query Service Provider,
which is a requirement for the Drugledger . In
other words, the proposed tool generates less
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Figure 6: Smart contract in Remix.
Table 2: Comparing Blockchain Solutions
Solution Drugledger [11] PharmaCrypt
Basic requirements
included
More focus on packaging and repackaging
(overall less efficient)
More focus on rapid scanning the product
(barcode scanning), asset creation and transfer
(overall much efficient)
Overhead High, due to the maintenance of certificates, per
transaction user weight computation, repackage
Low, none of them are required
Technology Platform dependent, C++ in Ubuntu 16.04 LTS Platform independent with AWS
Extra requirements for se-
curity support
Requires certificate of service provider Free from such requirement
Performance (efficiency) not specifically discussed, but much slower Improved using barcode scanning, average
block time 2.11s, page latency 2 ms, and con-
sensus available in a few seconds
Security key and hash stor-
age
There are issues with storing the public key and
hash codes
There are no such issues as the AWS storage
takes care of it
overhead compared to the Drugledger. A de-
tailed comparison between the PharmaCrypt and
Drugledger is presented in Figure 7.
Apart from this, a smart contract using smart
storage containers is proposed in [14], which is
based on a multi signature wallet of three parties
to process the payment and arbitrate disagree-
ments. The application requires extra hardware
and protocol implementation, which is time con-
suming as well as not efficient. Similar to the
approach in [6], the proposed tool is able to defeat
tampering, spamming, physical layer attack, and
preferential treatment. However, the approach in
[6] requires new sensors, their set up, and a
significant large storage for the algorithms to run.
Whereas the “PharmaCrypt” does not rely on
extra sensors, rather it used existing technology
of scanning the barcodes. The only drawback of
the proposed tool is that it may be affected by the
service provided by AWS, as it is based on the
AWS Blockchain.
A performance comparison between the Phar-
maCrypt and Drugledger is shown in Figure 7.
The system used is 64 bits Windows 10 with
core Intel i5 2.60GHz and 4GB RAM with
Java. For generating random strings we have
considered UUID.randomUUID().toString() and
used System.currentTimeMillis() for calculating
timestamps and execution times. SHA256() takes
20 ms for generating hash code for each block.
Further, it took 1 ms each to create block lifetime,
Merkle root, timestamp, and version. Due to the
insufficient implementation details available in
Drugledger [11] (the details are not provided,
so we created simple functions for Synchro-
nizeUTXO() - 20 ms, ReadDrugPackage() - 10
ms, GetUTXO() - 20 ms, ValidQuery() - 20 ms,
CreateTX() - 20 ms, Gossip() - 10 ms, and IsCor-
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(a) PharmaCrypt average block time where # of blocks range
from 10 to 200.
(b) PharmaCrypt vs. Drugledger block time where # of blocks
range from 10 to 50.
Figure 7: Details on average block time.
related() - 10 ms), we have assumed similar type
of parameters and their sizes as the PharmaCrypt.
Figure 7(a) demonstrates the average block time
when number of blocks are 10, 50, 100, and 200.
Figure 7(b) reflects on a comparative instances
of average block time when number of blocks
are 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 for PharmaCrypt and
Drugledger. Overall, it is clear that the Pharma-
Crypt outperforms Drugledger and is better suited
for such an application.
Alzahrani et al. [15] proposed (i) Block-
Supply, a decentralized anti-counterfeiting supply
chain that is based on NFC and blockchain tech-
nologies and (ii) a decentralized consensus proto-
col. However, it is not clear whether this protocol
can be used for Blockchain-related applications
such as PharmaCrypt. Wang et al. [16] combined
the emerging Blockchain technology with parallel
healthcare systems for comprehensive healthcare
data sharing, medical records review, and care
audit-ability. However, implementation aspect of
work is not discussed in detail. Jamil et al. [17]
proposed a novel drug supply chain management
using Hyperledger Fabric based on Blockchain
technology to handle secure drug supply chain
records. An open source framework Hyperledger
fabric is used, but it is not much clear whether
it supports existing healthcare systems and their
services. We will further extend this research and
see if any of these work can be extended and
integrated with PharmaCrypt.
Conclusion and Future Directions
This work has analysed the counterfeit drugs’
problem and existing solutions evaluating their
effectiveness. The inputs from the relevant indus-
try professionals working in both pharmaceuticals
industry and in Blockchain technology are con-
sidered, which has actually helped to scope the
requirements for the proposed application tool.
In our primary research, 100% of the pharmacists
interviewed were aware of the counterfeit drugs
problem, underlining just how widespread and
severe the issue is within the healthcare industry.
The work is being done in an attempt to fight the
issue, however, the current solutions have with a
number of issues and limitations.
Further research is required to look at how
we can achieve the smallest amount of time it
takes for a transaction to gain consensus. When
using an application, such as the one described,
it is important that this time is as low as possible,
otherwise it will not be efficient for suppliers to
use. Another need for further research would be
to look at how might it be possible to lower
the cost of implementation or understand how
the solutions may drive down other supply chain
operational costs in the pharmaceutical industry
so that the technology is commercially viable
for larger enterprise solutions. Furthermore, the
supply chain management system could be linked
to a wider solution. There is currently work
being undertaken to develop an Electronic Patient
Record system that can be used to store patient’s
records on a Blockchain. This system could po-
tentially be combined with a supply chain solu-
tion where by records in the Blockchain could
contain both patient treatment records, alongside
prescription history.
The Falsified EU Directive and RFID technol-
ogy are currently the most effective in addressing
the problem, up until now. The Blockchain solu-
tion would be able to incorporate the compliance
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regulations so that the tool logs and tracks the
information needed to comply with the directive.
The way in which the Blockchain tool is used can
mimic the RFID Mass serialization process, scan-
ning of products can be carried out at the same
points in the supply chain. This should enable a
smooth transition to the new technology. Utilising
the proposed solution, i.e., PharmaCrypt, means
that both patients and dispensaries will be made
certain of the provenance of the drug. The de-
veloped tool is relatively simple, meaning staff
should not need extensive training due to existing
product scanning experience in dispensaries.
Blockchain also has its limitations.
Blockchain has a scalability issue attached
to it. At this stage, it would be difficult to deploy
a Blockchain solution to all parties involved
in the supply chain. Large scale deployments
across multiple customers would require much
more rigorous testing to ensure success. Further
research is required to look at how we can
achieve the smallest amount of time it takes for
a transaction to gain consensus. When using
an application, such as the one described, it
is important that this time is low as possible
otherwise it will not be efficient for suppliers
to use. Another need for further research would
be to look at how might it be possible to lower
the cost of implementation or understand how
the solutions may drive down other supply chain
operational costs in the pharmaceutical industry
so that the technology is commercially viable for
larger enterprise solutions.
On reflection, we believe that the proposed
solution (PharmaCrypt application tool) has the
capacity to be developed towards a successful
working service and can be used as the basis for
further research and development.
Appendices
Interview Answers and Questions
We have interviewed 30 people who are directly
or indirectly working in pharmaceutical industry.
Q1. Are you aware of the counterfeit drugs
problem in the pharmaceutical industry?
A1. (i) Yes X 19
(ii) Yes, but I believe it to be more of a problem
in developing countries than in the UK. X 4
(iii) Yes I am aware, but I have never experienced
it myself X 5
(iv) Yes. As a chief pharmacist of an NHS trust
and a responsible person on a WDA from the
MHRA I am acutely aware of the potential for
falsified medicines entering the supply chain.
Q2. Do you know if there are any products or
systems in place that are used to track and trace
a drug through its supply chain before it gets to
the dispensary? If yes, could you explain what?
A2. (i) I don’t know X 4
(ii) The Falsified Medicines Directive is currently
being implemented X 9
(iii) EU Directive X 2
(iv) We use registered wholesalers; however, the
only system current being implemented is FMD
scanning X 10
(v) Scanning the products - Barcodes, QR codes
X 4
(vi) Up until recently some products have had
2D barcodes, holograms and tamper-evident
packaging to reduce falsification, although the
sophistication of counterfeiters now is such
that even these can be replicated. The main
intervention now is the introduction of the
Falsified Medicines Directive which requires
licenced medicines to have a 3D barcode,
a Unique Identification Number traceable to
individual packs, and tamper evident packaging.
Each individual pack is tracked via a Europe-
wide repository.
Q3. Are there any systems/methods in place you
use personally that help to ensure the authenticity
of the medicines supplied to customers? If yes,
could you explain what?
A3. (i) Medicines are scanned in on arrival,
but this is more for stock check purposes than
authenticity. MHRA supply regularly alerts us
if there are any concerns regarding medicines
and these are relayed to all pharmacies and
dispensary’s with relevant batch numbers. X 2
(ii) No X 6
(iii) Ensuring everything we order is done
through our trusted suppliers we use. X 2
(iv) FMD Scanners X 15
(v) Scanner but limited due to possible human
error X 4
(vi) Only those already mandated.
Q4. What information about a medicine would
you suggest needed to be logged to ensure its
authenticity?
Apr 2020 13
Journal of LATEX Class Files, Vol. xx, No. x, August 2019
A4. (i) Batch number, expiry date, manufacturer
X 7
(ii) If you look at what the Falsified Medicines
Safety Features Directive requires, it might give
you a good idea on what to include. Off the
top of my head, I believe it is required that
manufactures provide the name, serial number,
expiry date, strength and batch number but there
maybe more. X 2
(iii) Special packaging X 3
(iv) Name, batch number, wholesaler X 9
(v) Ingredient constituent and manufacturer who
has approved it
(vi) Product, batch number, expiry, PL number,
manufacturer. X 8
Q5. Would you consider using an application to
ensure the authenticity of medicines if it meant
scanning the bar code of each drug sold over the
counter?
A5. (i) Yes X 17
(ii) Yes, but it’s a hassle X 7
(iii) Possibly, depending on the efficiency of the
system X 3
(iv) We already scan products so yes X 2
(v) This is effectively what FMD requires for
prescription medicines. The same principle for
OTC medicines would probably work ok where
the process can be combined with another (e.g.
scanning at POS).
Q6. Are you aware of Blockchain or
cryptocurrency technology i.e Bitcoin?
A6. (i) Yes X 7
(ii) No X 4
(iii) Have heard of it but never used it. X 19
Q7. Would you put your trust in a Blockchain
driven application that was designed to track and
trace a medicine as it makes its way through
the Pharmaceutical Supply Chain? (Blockchain
is the technology behind cryptocurrencies like
bitcoin)
A7. (i) Yes X 12
(ii) No X 8
(iii) Unsure X 9
(iv) Would consider using it but would need
robust evidence and assurance before trusting it
completely.
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